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LEGAL PHILOSOPHY - RECENT

CONTRIBUTIONS
THE LEGAL CONSCIENCE
By FELix S. CotEN; Edited by Lucy KRAMER COEMN. New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1960. xvii, 505 pp. $12.50.
THE COMMON LAW TRADITION
By KAR N. LLEWELLYN. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1960.
xii, 565 pp. $8.50

THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS
By BENJ AMt CARIozo. New Haven: Yale University Press,
1921, as a paperbound, 1960. 180 pp. $.95.
LAW FINDING THROUGH EXPERIENCE
AND REASON
By RoscoE PouND. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1960.

ix, 65 pp. $2.50.
THE LAW AND ITS COMPASS
By LoD RADcOrIEE. Evanston: Northwestern University Press,
1960. xi, 99 pp. $4.00.
LEGAL philosophy may appear to some to be little more than a
pretentious title, but when defined as theories of and about law its
importance should be self evident. Every lawyer must at some
time raise within himself questions concerning law, its source,
its nature, its end, and numerous of its other ramifications, some
as broad as these and some more specific. For what reasonably
intelligent man can avoid questions concerning life, and what
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member of the legal profession can fail to perceive the aspect of
law in these questions? But to raise questions without seeking
answers is to depict the epitome of a mentally lazy individual.
Yet it is suspected that many will attempt to ignore philosophy just
as many will continue to ignore classical works in literature, art,
and music. Such an attempt can only result in blind futility for
it was William James who wisely observed that even those to
whom philosophy is anathema are ruled by it.
It is both unnecessary and unlikely that the average attorney
or law student will have more than a passing acquaintance with
the great legal philosophers of the past such as Plato, Aristotle,
Aquinas, Kant, Hegel, Hobbes, Locke, Savigny, Bentham, Jhering, and numerous others. Likewise he may be unfamiliar with
the different schools such as natural law, legal positivism, legal
historicism, sociological jurisprudence, legal utilitarianism, legal
realism, and a wide variety of other "isms." However, this lack

of full understanding of earlier philosophers should not preclude
anyone from the intellectual stimulus, satisfaction, and challenge

offered by contemporary jurisprudents. Nor should the public
duty aspect of the learned profession of law be overlooked.
Neither is it to be implied that jurisprudence is without value;
the practical perquisites are present, particularly on the appellate

level.
The books reviewed here are all of the type that can be read
critically by the well informed in this field or casually for practical
benefit and general satisfaction by the more nearly average reader.
The coherence and continuity of The Legal Conscience
almost defies the fact that it is a collection of selected papers,
treating such broad areas as: "Logic, Law and Ethics," "The
Indians Quest for Justice," and "The Philosophy of American
Democracy." The book is superbly organized, a tribute to its
editor, Lucy Kramer Cohen.
Felix Cohen has been generally associated with that school
generically labeled as legal realism. Although this label, as applied to the author, is not wholly inaccurate, yet the appellation
does not fit this book, for these writings do not evince an attempt
to either persuade or coerce the reader into accepting any one
philosophy of law. 'What is evinced is a clear plea for tolerance in
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all areas, a plea for tolerance among philosophers with a resultant
greater measure of truth, and a plea for tolerance among all men
with a resultant greater freedom for our society. This, as his overriding objective, is particularly revealed in his critical book reviews included in the book. The abstract problem posed by this
objective is that of applying ethical principles to legal principles
so as to attain justice. This could conceivably be done by employing that method known as legal realism but there is little in
these writings to suggest such an approach. Indeed by the author's
emphasis on tolerance such an approach must be discarded as far
too restrictive. The method enunciated is essentially eclectric. Thus
Felix Cohen cannot summarily dismiss Hobbes' natural law any
more than he can accept Jerome Frank's denial of absolutes or
Roscoe Pound's balancing of interests. Perhaps it would be fruitful for more philosophers to stop and question the actual differences in their ideas as opposed to supposed and misconceived
differences. By this type of examination Felix Cohen is able to
discard settled dogma and even question the degree of actual
difference between the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle. This
again is indicative of his own intelligent and inquiring tolerance.
Aside from the substantive content of the book, it is written
with remarkable clarity and is highly readable. The Legal Conscience leaves its reader with the warm feeling that the author
of its writings was a great lawyer, philosopher, and humanitarian
just as Felix S. Cohen is widely reputed to have been.
In contradistinction to Felix Cohen there has been no hesitancy
in placing the label of legal realism on professor Karl Llewellyn;
but it may be that he too has been mischaracterized, largely
through misunderstanding of his earlier book, Bramble Bush.
In The Common Law Tradition professor Llewellyn's differences
from Jerome Frank's realism are clearly illustrated, not by comparison but by a further elucidation of his own views; this makes
clear his idea of what he terms "realistic jurisprudence."
The major purpose of the book, however, is to convince the
reader that appellate results are "reckonable." It would be presumptuous to attempt, in this short review, to summarize the
author's proposed methods of predicting results, suffice it to say
that they are adequately and convincingly presented. The scholarship displayed in this detailed study of the efflorescence of
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appellate decisions is staggering; approximately six hundred appellate decisions are examined in some detail for a determination
of how the result was reached.
As must be expected, a considerable portion of the book is
devoted to an examination of the place of stare decisis in our law.
Professor Llewellyn emphatically rejects the contemporary and
sensational heresy that judges decide as they wish without revealing their true reasons in the opinion. Thus, stare decisis does
have a decided import to our law, but in Llewellyn's "Grand
Style" of judging, the use of good sense, wisdom and an "ongoing" readjustment of prior doctrine reign supreme over the
cold legal logic of the "Formal Style."
This review is one place where expressio unius is clearly inapplicable; the book contains a broad wealth of additional material, valuable not only to legal theorists but of practical value to
practitioners as well and of virtually indispensable value to judges.
In addition it should provide solace to all who have been disturbed
by the skepticism aroused by the absolutists in legal realism. To
these doubting-Thomases the Common Law Tradition: Deciding
Appeals is sufficient proof to dispel any lack of respect for our
judicial process.
Professor Llewellyn in analyzing the rise in reckonability of
result in appellate courts finds that this grew out of a gradual
transformation to the "Grand Style" of judging; he states that he
does "not spot heavy influence of any particular leading figures
unless it be Cardozo." This influence was made possible by the
respectability of Cardozo, which made it difficult to label him an
iconoclast despite his abrupt departure from the "Formal Style."
The credentials and general views of Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo should be too well known to bear repetition here. His book,
The Nature of the Judicial Process, is a work sufficiently classic
in nature to merit a place beside Holmes' The Common Law on
every lawyer's or law student's book shelf and since it is now
published in a paperback edition there should be no rationalization for failure to read and reread this classic.
Cardozo concluded these Storrs lectures, delivered in 1920,
with:
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The future, gentlemen, is yours. We have been called to do
our parts in an ageless process. Long after I am dead and
gone, and my little part in it is forgotten, you will be here
to do your share, and to carry the torch forward. I know that
the flame will bum bright while the torch is in your keeping.
This reviewer suggests that a part of our "share" is to see
that Justice Cardozo's 'little part in it" is not forgotten.
The next writer is that current rarity in jurisprudence, a man
who has not been categorized by the label of legal realism. Roscoe Pound is the leader of the school known as sociological jurisprudence, although perhaps better described as functional
jurisprudence. His current lectures, published as Law Finding
Through Experience And Reason, are no departure from his
established philosophy. Especially clear in the book is his adherence to two of his long standing tenets: that it is impossible
to understand what something is without studying what it does,
and that decisions can only be good for the present.
In his first lecture, "Law Making and Law Finding," Dean
Pound emphasizes the necessity of drawing a precise definition
of law as opposed to the definition of laws. "Law is needed to
achieve and maintain justice. Laws are needed to keep the peace
-to maintain order... Law is found; Laws are made." The
dearth of precise understanding of this distinction is attributed
largely to vocabulary and translation deficiencies. But, despite the
reason, it is essential that the distinction be both understood and
made. Law must be a moral and ethical force to adequately
govern life and hence must adapt to the growth and changes in
life. Laws on the other hand are enunciated by the sovereign
authority and are therefore basically political in nature. With
this distinction clearly drawn, the law is examined as it was
developed by the historical school. Pound, utilizing his functional approach, sees two primal errors in this method; first, the
law tends to become frozen, and second, historical accidents tend
to become established as legal principles.
"Stare Decisis," the second lecture, is a discussion of the
quandary caused by the necessity that law be both stable and
progressive. Here Dean Pound briefly examines the twentiethcentury methods of jurisprudence and elaborates on the char-
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acteristics and tenets of the contemporary sociological jurists.
The lecture is concluded with a plea for his concept of social
engineering.
The theme for the last lecture, "Reason and Reasoning in
Law Finding," is reminiscent of the first lecture; here reason and
reasoning are explained and the confusion between the two is
deplored. It is clear that reasoning from analogies of the past
can produce a result which might well defy reason; this is illustrated by numerous examples of such practices and their undesirable consequences in law.
Throughout the book there is concern for the necessary trend
of law away from a local to a universal nature. This is an aspect
of our law which cannot be emphasized long or loudly enough;
far too many present members of the bar are content to rest complacently enshrouded with their own pettifogging provincialism.
Roscoe Pound has written upwards of 250 articles, in the
neighborhood of 15 books and a magnum opus. This feat, coupled
with other vast accomplishments, has established him as Dean
Emeritus not only of Harvard Law School but of all American
jurisprudents as well. This pre-eminence alone is sufficient to
lend authority and pertinence to the book, which is also a thoroughly enjoyable and quite readable book. Any criticisms must
be minor and in the light of Emerson's advice to Holmes, "when
you strike at a king you must kill him," they will be foregone
here.
The final book reviewed here presents a welcome and perhaps
necessary contrast to the preceding works. Lord Radcliffe, one
of Britain's most distinguished citizens, poses, by implication, the
question whether law can be adequately implemented by the
Austinian command theory, Savigny's historicism, Holmes' positivism, Pound's social engineering, Kelsen's pure science, or the
realism of Ehrlich and Frank. Is the lawyer merely a highly
skilled mechanic or is he something more? Lord Radcliffe does
not answer this question other than to state that the lawyer
should be something more, something brought about through a
deeply instilled faith in the attributes and purpose of man. What
Lord Radcliffe is earnestly expounding is that the law "needs a
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standard of reference outside itself." The author contends, and it
is here conceded, that there is such a reference in natural law;
the difficulty is that as yet there is no means of applying it to the
present administration of justice. And since natural law is still
scarcely better defined than as Holmes' "brooding omnipresence
in the sky" it is impossible to test our present law by a natural
law standard. There is much merit in the book's thesis but
regrettably the questions inherent in any natural law concept
still remain. The author's best attempt at finding the source of
natural law is in his idea that law cannot be learned by learning
law (here the author has, wittingly or unwittingly, accepted much
of Pound's philosophy). This idea that law must be a part of
history, economics, sociology, ethics, and a philosophy of life
is appealing and, incidentally, a well deserved boost to the
liberal arts education. Not so appealing is the author's lamentation that Christianity is no longer accepted as part of the
law of the land in England; the acceptance of Christianity as law
would still provide no method for determining what was accepted,
for contrary to the author's quote from an 1841 English Commissioners' report, there are no "positive rules of Christianity."
Thus, the necessity for some method, whether it be realism, social
engineering or another must still exist. The inherent problem with
natural law - how to implement it - still exists. But, paradoxically, Lord Radcliffe is probably correct in his belief that natural
law cannot and will not die (the assumption that this is correct
is made despite, or possibly because of, the ethereal quality of
natural law); this reviewer sincerely hopes that in at least this
respect the author is wholly correct.
It is interesting to note that in The Law and Its Compass a
problem is raised that almost perfectly parallels one raised in
Roscoe Pound's Law Finding. Dean Pound characterized it as the
need to clearly distinguish between law and laws; Lord Radcliffe
characterizes it as the failure to draw a distinction, such as that
made in French jurisprudence, between ordre public and bonnes
moeurs, - public order and the decency of private life. The requirements of the former are basically objective while those of the
latter are approached subjectively with the person clearly envisaged as possessing certain inalienable rights. While the nomenclature may differ the problem is drawn essentially the same by
both Pound and Radcliffe.
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On the whole this is an excellent book, both thought provoking and highly interesting, it provides an idealistic complement to
the more realistic approaches reviewed previously. The criticisms
of the lecture are not severe but are those customarily applied
to an exponent of natural law. Criticism, however, should never
be equated with a paucity of admiration or respect.
To gain a comprehensive understanding of law it is necessary
to make inquiry into its nature and promulgation, its end, content
and source, and its sanction and the reason why it obliges. This
understanding is vital both to a lawyer's practice and to democracy. What De Tocqueville said a century ago is still pertinent
today: "I cannot believe that a republic could hope to exist at
the present time if the influence of lawyers in public business
did not increase in proportion to the power of the people." This
confidence in the lawyers' influence was not instilled by their
ability to file pleadings; just as "a lawyer without history or
literature is a mechanic, a mere mason" he is, a fortiori, a "mere
mason" if he is without an understanding of jurisprudence.
NEIL W. SCHILKE

